Disability and earnings: Are employer characteristics important? by Jones, Melanie & Latreille, Paul L.
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/86652/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Jones, Melanie and Latreille, Paul L. 2010. Disability and earnings: Are employer characteristics
important? Economics Letters 106 (3) , pp. 191-194. 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.11.017 file 
Publishers page: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.11.017
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.11.017>
Please note: 
Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
 1 
Disability and Earnings: Are Employer Characteristics Important?  
 
 
 
Melanie K. Jones and Paul L. Latreille* 
 
School of Business and Economics 
Swansea University 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We use matched employee-employer data from Britain to assess the influence of disability-
specific workplace policies and practices on the earnings of disabled workers. The presence 
of equal opportunities policies increases the relative wages of disabled workers, but this is 
partially offset by the negative influence of workplace accommodations. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a growing literature examining differences in labour market outcomes between 
disabled and non-disabled individuals (see for example, Jones et al., 2006; DeLeire, 2001). 
Whilst these studies consider the influence of personal, household, regional and employment-
related characteristics, the literature neglects the potentially important role of employer 
characteristics, which have been found significant in the analysis of earnings amongst other 
minority groups (Mumford and Smith, 2007). These may be particularly important in the 
disability context since in many countries legislative reforms incorporate important elements 
regarding employer practices. For example, in the UK and the US, under the 1995 Disability 
Discrimination Act (DDA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) respectively, 
employers have a duty to make ‘reasonable accommodations’ to facilitate access for disabled 
individuals. Evaluation of the ADA suggests that by imposing costs on employers, the 
accommodation element may have reduced demand for disabled workers (Acemoglu and 
Angrist, 2001). The potential influence of accommodation on earnings is also unclear: as 
Baldwin and Johnson (2001) note, whilst accommodations may increase the productivity of 
disabled workers, employers may try to pass on the cost to disabled workers through reduced 
earnings.1  
 
The analysis of disability has received less attention at the workplace, rather than individual, 
level. In the UK, evidence on issues such as employer awareness of the DDA, perceptions of 
disability, prevalence of adjustments and disability-related practices has largely come from 
specialized surveys of employers (Simm et al., 2007; Woodhams and Corby, 2007). The 
approach used here, which deploys a large-scale matched employee-employer dataset in 
                                                 
1
 Direct evidence relating to workplace accommodations is limited. Studies have considered the determinants of 
receiving an accommodation (see, for example, Campolieti, 2004). Burkhauser et al. (1995) examine the impact 
of workplace accommodations on job exit and Gunderson and Hyatt (1996) use a specialized dataset from 
Ontario to examine the impact of accommodation on the earnings of injured workers. 
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Britain, the 2004 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS 2004), contributes to and 
links both these elements of the literature, by examining the impact of organizational policies 
on the outcomes of disabled employees. 
 
2. Data  
WERS 2004 is a stratified random sample of 2,295 establishments with more than 5 
employees taken from the Inter-Departmental Business Register maintained by the Office for 
National Statistics. Data on workplace characteristics are obtained from a management 
questionnaire, whereas information relating to employees is taken from a self-completed 
questionnaire given to a random sample of 25 employees at each establishment (or all 
employees in smaller workplaces). Employees are defined as work-limited disabled if they 
answer positively to the following two questions: 
 
Do you have any long-term illness, health problem or disability? By long-term, we mean that 
it can be expected to last for more than one year. 
 
and 
 
Does this illness or disability affect the amount or type of work you can do? 
 
The remaining sample forms the ‘non-disabled’ group.2 It should be acknowledged that since 
this measure is self-reported it shares the limitations of all such measures (see Bound, 1991).3 
In addition to information on personal characteristics, employees are asked about their 
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 Individuals should only answer the second question following a positive response to the first. A small number 
of mutually inconsistent responses are dropped from the analysis.  
3
 The sample is restricted to full-time employees to reduce the problem of justification bias, that is, where the 
non-employed have an incentive to over-report disability. 
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earnings. The bounded nature of these responses is typically dealt with in one of two ways: 
the mid-point of the pay band can be adjusted by a (continuous) measure of usual hours to 
create a continuous measure of hourly pay (see Mumford and Smith, 2007) or interval 
regression can be applied on the bounded pay variable, which again may be adjusted for 
hours of work (see Booth and Bryan, 2004). Both approaches are applied to examine the 
sensitivity of the results.  
 
3. Methodology 
The basic Mincer-type earnings equation is extended to consider workplace characteristics, 
and, in particular, the role of disability-related workplace characteristics as follows:4  
ijjijjjijij YDYZXW        (1) 
where ijW  is the log of hourly earnings for individual i in workplace j. Standard personal and 
household characteristics are included in ijX , while jZ  captures observable workplace 
characteristics such as size and occupational distribution. Workplace characteristics 
specifically related to disability are included in jY . These include the existence of a formal 
equal opportunities (EO) policy explicitly mentioning the disabled, which is included to 
capture management response to disability equality issues. Since such policies have been 
criticised as being ‘empty shells’ (Hoque and Noon, 2004) these controls are supplemented 
with information relating to employer actions, specifically whether the employer reviews 
relative pay on the basis of disability.5 The percentage of the workforce that is disabled 
according to the manager is also included, following similar analysis in relation to gender 
                                                 
4
 It is not possible to control for the potential sample selection bias created by focusing only on employees. 
Fortunately, previous analysis finds that controls for this selection bias are often insignificant in earnings 
equations, albeit when estimated separately by disability status (see Jones et al., 2006). 
5
 Information is also provided on monitoring disability in recruitment and selection, and promotion. Given the 
current context a control for monitoring pay appears most appropriate. Indeed, a more general measure of ‘any’ 
monitoring is not a significant determinant of the earnings of the disabled. 
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segregation (Mumford and Smith, 2007). Finally, given the debate on the influence of 
workplace accommodations, our controls include whether an adjustment has been made to 
the workplace to accommodate the disabled. Interactions between each of these variables and 
individual disability status ( ijD ) will capture any disability-specific effect. In an additional 
specification we utilise the ‘panel’ element of the data to control for unobserved workplace 
heterogeneity by replacing the controls for observable workplace characteristics with 
workplace fixed effects. Both specifications assume the influence of personal and other 
workplace characteristics are common between the disability groups. The main results are not 
sensitive to this.  
 
4. Results 
Table 1 documents the prevalence of disability-specific policies and practices amongst 
workplaces in Great Britain. On average managers report that just over 1% of their workforce 
is disabled; nearly 87% report having no disabled workers. Despite this, more than a fifth 
reported having made an adjustment, which may reflect over-reporting or that workplaces 
have made adaptations for former or potential disabled employees.6 Over 55% of workplaces 
have a written EO policy mentioning disability, and nearly 10% take positive actions to 
recruit disabled individuals. Fewer monitor pay or other outcomes such as promotion of their 
disabled workers. Disability-related workplace characteristics are more prevalent in the 
public sector, part of which is explained by workplace size, but public authorities are also 
under a greater obligation – at least following the DDA 2005 – to be proactive regarding 
disability equality.  
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 This proportion is similar to those who reported having identified issues with workplace accessibility for the 
disabled.  
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Table 2 presents responses from both manager and employee surveys in terms of the 
disability incidence, both defined consistently as being work-limiting. The proportion of 
employees self-reporting disability exceeds the (average) estimate reported by the manager. 
This difference remains even when using matched data and comparing responses within a 
workplace. If we assume the status reported by individuals reflects the ‘true’ incidence, then 
the evidence indicates the sample of employees consistently over-represents disabled workers 
or that managers underestimate disability amongst their workforce. The latter would be 
consistent with employers having a more narrow perception of disability (Simm et al., 2007), 
and/or that the channels for reporting disability are limited, and/or that employees are 
reluctant to disclose in anticipation of discrimination. Similar comparisons by gender and 
ethnicity confirm that the difference in reporting is particularly pronounced with disability.  
 
In these data, the disabled earn (on average) just over 90% of the non-disabled in the sample 
(£9.01 per hour compared with £9.83 for the non-disabled), which is broadly comparable 
with data from the Labour Force Survey. Many of the other descriptive features of the 
employee data are also consistent with those reported in the existing literature (see Jones et 
al. 2006). 
 
The focus of the results from the earnings equations (presented in Table 3) is on the influence 
of disability-related workplace characteristics since these have not been examined elsewhere. 
The models include an extensive set of personal and workplace controls which are not 
reported here, most of which operate as might be expected a priori.7 Column (1) reports a 
simple OLS model in which the impact of disability operates via an intercept shift only. In 
this model the disability earnings penalty, controlling for other factors, is approximately 5½% 
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 Descriptive statistics and coefficient estimates relating to the remaining employer and employee characteristics 
are available on request. 
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and the disability related workplace characteristics have no significant influence on earnings. 
The specification in column (3) replaces the workplace characteristics in column (1) with 
workplace fixed effects. The impact of disability is slightly reduced (to just over 4%) 
suggesting the negative association between disability and earnings is not explained by 
disabled workers selecting into low paying workplaces; it actually exists between disabled 
and non-disabled workers within the same workplace.  
 
Column (2) augments (1) with the disability interactions discussed above. With the exception 
of workplace adjustments for the disabled, the disability workplace characteristics have no 
effect on the earnings of non-disabled workers.8 These characteristics have a more important 
influence on the earnings of disabled workers, suggesting they are not merely ‘empty shells’ 
(Hoque and Noon, 2004).9 Indeed, unlike Davies and Welpton (2008) who find no influence 
of EO policies on the gender pay gap, we find that, disabled employees in workplaces with 
EO policies that make reference to disability earn nearly 9% more than those working in 
establishments where they are absent.10 In contrast, being employed in a workplace that has 
made adjustments for the disabled is associated with a significant decline (5%) in earnings for 
the disabled.11 Whilst it is not possible to match the adjustment to a particular disabled 
employee, this is consistent with the arguments of Acemoglu and Angrist (2001): by raising 
the costs of employing disabled workers, legislation may have unintended consequences. In 
this context it would appear that some of the (perceived) cost of adjustment is ‘passed on’ in 
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 The weakly positive relationship between workplace adjustments and earnings may reflect the fact that both 
would be associated with ‘good employers’.  
9
 The results from column (2) are qualitatively similar if instead, the model is estimated using interval regression 
on the bounded pay weekly measure with a control for usual weekly hours. They are also robust to the use of 
complex survey weights. 
10
 These interactions are interpreted as differences from the relevant shift coefficients. Since the latter are very 
small and insignificant, the interactions essentially denote the impact of the policies on the disabled. 
11
 This specification also suggests that working in a workplace which monitors pay increases the earnings of the 
disabled by 8% but that being employed in a workplace with a greater proportion of disabled workers is 
associated with a small pay penalty for the disabled. Neither influence is significant after controlling for 
workplace fixed effects. 
 8 
the form of lower wages for the disabled.12, 13 Both influences are robust to the inclusion of 
workplace fixed effects in column (4), suggesting the disability pay gap within workplaces 
with an EO policy is narrower than in those without, whereas the reverse is true for 
workplaces who make an adjustment for the disabled.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper uses matched employee-employer data in Great Britain and finds that disability-
related practices are important determinants of the relative earnings of disabled workers. 
Disabled employees in workplaces with formal equal opportunities policies earn more, all 
else equal, and this serves to reduce the disability pay gap. More surprisingly, workplaces 
which have made an adjustment for a disabled employee appear to pass some of this cost onto 
disabled employees in the form of a pay penalty, again raising concerns about the impact of 
this aspect of legislation.  
 
                                                 
12
 An earnings penalty may also be observed if the presence of an adjustment proxies for the limitation 
engendered by disability. This would happen if, for example, the presence of an accommodation indicated the 
firm was hiring from a group of more restricted (less productive) disabled workers. Unfortunately, there are no 
controls within WERS for the severity of the disability. However, since the adjustment is measured at the 
workplace level it is not necessarily related to the needs of a particular disabled employee.  
13
 The equations have also been estimated separately for the public and private sectors. The evidence of an 
earnings penalty for accommodation exists in the public sector, where disability policies are concentrated.  
 9 
References 
 
Acemoglu D. and Angrist J.D., 2001, Consequence of employment protection? The case of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, Journal of Political Economy 19(5), 915-950. 
 
Baldwin, M. and Johnson, W. G., 2001, Dispelling the myths about work disability, paper 
prepared for the 1998 IRRA Research Volume, New Approaches to Disability in the 
Workplace, Cornell University Press. 
 
Booth, A. and Bryan M., 2004, The union membership wage-premium puzzle: is there a free 
rider problem? Industrial and Labor Relations Review 57(3), 401-421. 
 
Bound, J., 1991, Self-reported versus objective measures of health in retirement models, 
Journal of Human Resources 26(1), 106-138. 
 
Burkhauser, R., Butler, J. and Kim, Y., 1995, The importance of job accommodation on the 
job duration of workers with disabilities: a hazard model approach, Labour 
Economics 2(2), 109-130. 
 
Campolieti, M., 2004, The correlates of accommodations for permanently disabled workers, 
Industrial Relations 43(3), 546-572.  
 
Davies, R and Welpton, R., 2008, How does workplace monitoring affect the gender wage 
differential? Analysis of the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings and the 2004 
 10 
Workplace Employment Relations Survey – A research note, British Journal of 
Industrial Relations 46(4), 732-749. 
  
DeLeire, T., 2001, Changes in wage discrimination against people with disabilities: 1984-
1993, Journal of Human Resources 36(1), 145-158. 
 
Gunderson, M. and Hyatt, D., 1996, Do injured workers pay for reasonable accommodation?, 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 50(1), 92-104. 
 
Hoque, K. and Noon, M., 2004, Equal opportunities policy and practice in Britain: evaluating 
the ‘empty shell’ hypothesis, Work Employment and Society 18(3), 481-506. 
 
Jones, M. K., Latreille, P. L. and Sloane, P. J., 2006, Disability, gender and the British labour 
market, Oxford Economic Papers 58(3), 407-459. 
 
Mumford, K. and Smith, P. N., 2007, The gender earnings gap in Britain: including the 
workplace, Manchester School 75(6), 653-672. 
 
Simm, C., Aston, J., Williams, C., Hill, D., Bellis, A. and Meager, N., 2007, Organisations' 
responses to the Disability Discrimination Act, Department for Work and Pensions 
Research Report No. 410 (CDS, Leeds). 
 
Woodhams, C. and Corby, S., 2007, Then and now: disability legislation and employers' 
practices in the UK, British Journal of Industrial Relations 45(3), 556–580. 
 
 11 
Table 1. Disability related workplace characteristics.  
 
 All Private Public 
Average % workforce disabled 1.09 0.97 1.69 
% of workplaces with    
No disabled employee 86.60 88.35 78.27 
Disability adjustment 22.09 16.83 48.13 
EO policy covers disabled 55.56 49.74 84.30 
Monitor pay disabled  3.30 1.65 12.17 
Actively recruit disabled 9.06 4.43 31.15 
Notes: Statistics are based on a sample of workplaces. Data are weighted. 
 
 
Table 2. Disability reporting by managers and employees. 
 
 All workplaces Matched workplaces 
  
Managers 
 
Employee 
% in sample of employees – 
 % reported by managers 
% disabled 1.09 4.54 2.81 (105%) 
% disabled private 0.97 4.25 2.84 (113%) 
% disabled public 1.69 5.39 3.23 (105%) 
% female 54.38 49.45 2.71 (16%) 
% ethnic minority 6.27 7.09 -0.65 (-12%) 
Notes: Data are weighted. 
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Table 3. Determinants of earnings 
 
 OLS 
 
(1) 
OLS 
 
(2) 
Workplace 
fixed effects 
(3) 
Workplace 
fixed effects 
(4) 
Disability -0.054*** 
(0.014) 
-0.091** 
(0.046) 
-0.042*** 
(0.012) 
-0.064* 
(0.035) 
Proportion disabled -0.054 
(0.065) 
0.029 
(0.088) 
  
Adjustment 0.008 
(0.006) 
0.011* 
(0.006) 
  
EO policy for disabled 0.005 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
  
Monitor disabled pay 0.004 
(0.010) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
  
Disability  Proportion 
disabled 
 -0.235** 
(0.116) 
 -0.214 
(0.151) 
Disability  Adjustment  -0.063** 
(0.028) 
 -0.065** 
(0.026) 
Disability  EO policy 
covers disabled 
 0.088* 
(0.047) 
 0.076** 
(0.037) 
Disability  Monitor 
disabled pay 
 0.079* 
(0.046) 
 0.036 
(0.046) 
R2  0.59 0.59 0.67 0.67 
F-test 
[p-value] 
241.57 
[0.00] 
230.38 
[0.00] 
195.75 
[0.00] 
178.88 
 [0.00] 
Observations 12504 12504 12504 12504 
Workplaces 1416 1416 1416 1416 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. Data are unweighted. 
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Controls are also included for gender, ethnicity, age, tenure, 
qualifications, over-education, gender mix of job, temporary contract, supervisory responsibilities, union 
membership, marital status, dependent children and occupation in all models. Workplace characteristics, 
namely, industry, region, workplace size, use of performance related pay and job evaluation schemes, workplace 
unionisation, occupational mix and employment growth are also included in columns (1) and (2). 
